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Introduction-Survivor Stories
DANIEL R. ORTIZ

We are all survivors. We understand both the lash we avoid and the
comfort we embrace from the pain we remember. Both suffering and trauma
mark our experience.
In "Constitutions and 'Survivor Stories'," a conference held at the University of California, Santa Cruz, on January 13 and 14, 1995, participants from
many disciplines argued over how surviving has marked us. What effect has
surviving had on our political culture? How has it shaped what we demand of
law and what law in turn can give us? Has it sharpened or occluded our
memory of our own experience? More importantly, perhaps, is survivorship
itself a form of victimhood? Does it condemn those who have outlasted
suffering to repeat the patterns of their pain? Do our stories of survival
liberate or enslave us? Can we, in other words, survive our own survivor
stories? These are just a few of the issues the conference considered.
Robert Meister's Sojourners and Survivors: Two Logics of Constitutional
Protection' traces the influence of survivorship on American antidiscrimination
law. He sees in our history two major, competing conceptions of discrimination. The first, which he calls the "sojourner model,"2 grounds individual
rights in interstate comity. It holds that "[flederally protected constitutional
rights [a]re not rooted in natural rights of individuals, but [a]re rather the
traces of one's own state's equal and alternative claim to sovereignty in the
interstate system." 3 In this view, which Meister argues Chief Justices Marshall
and Taney and President Wilson all shared, respect for individual rights springs
from the sovereignty of the state the sojourning individual comes from, not
from any sovereignty the individual himself possesses. Any equality among
individuals derives from equality among states. Dred Scott4 worked out the
implications of this model most notoriously. In that case, the Court argued
that respecting slave states' sovereignty required free states to recognize
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slaveholders' right to human property. The slaves' human rights yielded to
slaveholders' assertion of their own states' sovereignty.
Against this model, Meister finds another working. This competing model,
which he calls "Lincolnian," 5 rests on a particular interpretation of the
nation's civil war experience. The Lincolnian model views that "national
trauma as a unifying experienc[e] and . . . seeks to replace the moral logic of
victim and perpetrator with the moral logic of common survivorship and
collective rebirth." 6 It sees all of us, victim and perpetrator alike, as survivors
of slavery. To overcome the threat of continuing victimization and to ease
political acceptance by defeated perpetrators, Lincolnianism puts everyone on
an "equal moral footing." 7 To some, this fresh start approach to moral
bankruptcy will prove troubling. As Meister admits, it does a better job of
relieving guilt than of doing justice.8
Meister's modelling pays off in two ways: it helps explain much of our
constitutional history and it offers criticism of some strands of contemporary
legal theory. First, Meister argues that the development of American constitutional law marks a shift from a pure sojourner model-in cases like Dred
Scott, the Slaughter-House Cases,9 and the Civil Rights Cases'°--to a model
conflicted between sojourners and survivors. In his view, Brown v Board of
Education" and its progeny mark the high point of this tension. Second,
Meister points out that to the extent we accept the Lincolnian view of the
14th Amendment we should "stop listening to the voice of the victim insofar
as this is what it takes to recover from a traumatic history and to reunite." 2
This call to "stop listening" has disturbing implications not only for critical
race theorists, as Meister notes, but also for any brand of legal theory that
privileges the voice of personal experience.
Wendy Brown's In the 'folds of our own discourse' The Pleasures and
Freedoms of Silence 3 pursues this same argument from a different angle.
Brown notes that in our age without certainties the personal voice has assumed
the mantle of truth and experience has become our only authority. Citing
"compulsory feminist discursivity,"' 4 she decries the emptying of private life
into the public realm and the consequent trivialization of the public sphere. As
she puts it, "these [individual] productions of truth not only bear the capacity
to chain us to our injurious histories as well as the stations of our small lives
but also to instigate the further regulation of those lives, all the while depoliti-
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cizing their conditions."" s
Confession, Brown fears, may become the regulatory truth of the identity
group. By privileging survivor stories, we make the story of greatest suffering
the greatest truth about the identity group. 16 The ultimate danger is that the
tellers of survivor stories will, by constantly retelling their trauma, debilitate
themselves from ever overcoming it. The survivor's voice, in this view, represents a most effective form of self-victimization. As Brown describes the
problem, first-person survivor's discourse can "silence those whose experiences
do not parallel those whose suffering is most marked . . . [and the stories]
also condemn those whose sufferings they record to a permanent identification
with that suffering."' 7
Brown calls on us to assume a more complex relationship to the trauma
than just declaring its truth. To her, that traditional position is largely selfdefeating. Instead, she asks women (and implicitly members of other victim
groups) to experiment with "silence." By that term she means more than
simply quiet. Silence can be that, but more important it "signifies a relation to
regulatory discourses, as well as a possible niche for the practice of freedom
within those discourses."'" Silence is both quiet and resistance. In feminism,
it entails, among other things, the calling into question of those personal truths
that victim discourse privileges.
Judith Butler's Burning Acts: Injurious Speech'9 approaches trauma discourse from the opposite perspective. She considers the dangers in perpetrators,
not victims, employing this rhetoric. To her, hate speech represents trauma
discourse from the oppressor's perspective. Through hate speech the perpetrator invokes the victim's whole history of oppression in order to make that
oppression powerfully present. Unlike Meister, who believes that hate speech
violates the Lincolnian survivors' covenant against looking back, Butler believes
that hate speech presents a more specific problem. It injures not through
raising painful memory, but through reinstating a powerful form of oppression.
Its injury lies not in reminding victims and perpetrators of their trauma, but
in making past victims victims once again.
Butler works this insight quite deeply. By analyzing the rhetoric of the
Supreme Court's hate speech decisions, she argues that the Court not only has
normalized racism but also has done injury itself. Even more interestingly,
Butler plays out this analysis by looking at Catherine MacKinnon's identification of pornography as a kind of hate speech. This overly simple identification,
Butler argues, aids neither women nor the victims of hate speech. It confuses
representation with reality.
In Freedom of Speech and the Constitutional Tension Method,0 Eugene
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Volokh agrees that hate speech injures but argues that a legal cure is worse
than the harm. He identifies what he calls the "constitutional tension method" 21 as the interpretive methodology required to validate hate speech regulation under the First Amendment. This method rests on the belief "that the
Constitution itself defines certain kinds of political truth, and that speech
which interferes with the implementation of this truth may be suppressed." 22
In this view, hate speech may be regulated because it conflicts with the value
of equality, which the Fourteenth Amendment and other parts of our Constitution enshrine.
After reviewing the history of this general approach to the First Amendment, a history that has permitted suppression of much political speech,
Volokh asks why we should think that this method would work any better
today. In the past, this approach allowed suppression of some unpopular
speech because it conflicted with democracy, one of the Constitution's central
values. Would regulation in the name of equality do any better? In particular,
considering the people who occupy the bench, might this method not redound
to the injury of those it is intended to protect?
In Declarations of Rights,23 Jeremy Elkins investigates a different kind of
survivor's story-that of the political survivor. He argues that the constitutional history of the American Revolution reflects our having survived a trauma of
political legitimacy. In his view, the conflict between an imperial and colonial
politics resulted in a kind of aspirational constitutional theory. This peculiarly
American approach sees constitutional rights not as legally enforceable
protections, but rather as statements designed to shape our political culture. As
Elkins writes, "[t]he point of declaring .. .rights ...was not thus to enact
a law, but to articulate certain aspects of the nature of the people and the
state-aspects which might otherwise tend to be poorly represented." 24 Or, as
he later writes, "by articulating certain fundamental principles, these declarations would ...help to recall and to promote at least part of what governmental institutions were most likely and dangerously to forget."2" Rights
were, in other words, designed to remind us of what we should strive to be.
Does such a conception of rights leave any room for judicial review?
Elkins believes that it does, but only if we radically reconceive judicial review
itself. As he reads our history, the political crisis we survived through the
Revolution problematized the notion of political representation. "[T]he people," he writes, are "not ever fully embodied within any institutional form"
and so "proper representation of "the people" requires the existence of
counterpoints to the particular representation of the people that any single
institution offers."26 This gap between the people and their structures of
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representation invites the judiciary to play a novel representation-reinforcing
role. In Elkins's view, judges should not see their role principally as ascertaining the intrinsic meaning of a text or discovering the intentions of the framers,
but rather as representing certain fundamental aspects of the people that are
likely to be neglected by other political institutions. Such judicial review would
make institutions better reflect the people while at the same time admitting
that the people can never be perfectly embodied within them.
The papers, like the conference itself, present a lively discussion of some
of the most central political issues of our time. They contribute to several
longstanding legal debates-from the doctrinal to the theoretical-and question
much orthodoxy. Any further introduction would merely postpone their
enjoyment.

